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INTRODUCTION

Dr. Maris gave my mother her last laugh.' Every week or so, Dr. Maris,
dressed in black, would approach me near the nurses' station to report that my
mother had said, "It's time." At issue was the expensive bag of blood clotting

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University, and co-director, Georgetown-Johns
Hopkins joint program in law and public health. J.D., Yale University, 1987. M.D., Yale
University, 1984. Preparation of this paper was supported in part by a Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation Investigator Award in Health Policy Research. I thank Kenneth Arrow,
Margaret M. Blair, Peter J. Hammer, Donald C. Langevoort, William Sage, Elyn Saks, Ellen
Waldman, and participants in Georgetown University Law Center's faculty research
workshop for their suggestions and Erica Pape and Elizabeth Jungman for their research
assistance. Some of the ideas in this paper were presented in earlier form at a National
Institutes of Health Center for Clinical Bioethics workshop on trust and a Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation Investigator Awards Competition Cluster Group symposium on
Kenneth Arrow's contribution to health economics.
1. The events I relate below occurred in the spring of 1997, at a nursing and hospice
care facility near Baltimore. I have given the doctor a pseudonym.
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cells Dr. Maris reluctantly hung over my mother's bed every few days. The
cells kept my mother alive. Leukemia had destroyed her bone marrow. She
couldn't make her own blood cells, and she would bleed to death unless the
little, straw-colored bags kept appearing atop her IV line.
My mother's cancer was untreatable. Johns Hopkins Hospital had
discharged her, and money was a problem. But her prognosis, death within
weeks, made her eligible for Medicare's hospice benefit. She was a winning
economic proposition for any hospice program that would take her-unless the
clotting cells were part of the bargain. But my mother insisted on them, and the
hospice program that admitted her went along. Weeks, though, stretched into
months. My mother did not die. Instead, she kept consuming clotting cells and
incurring costs above Medicare's payment rate.
My mother stayed alert, without pain, as end-stage leukemia patients
commonly do until their last hours. The first time Dr. Maris told me that my
mother was "ready" for the clotting cells to stop, I went into her room girded
for the final farewell. She insisted she had said no such thing, and she begged
me to keep the cells coming. I did so. A week later, Dr. Maris, my mother, and
I repeated this cycle. It became a routine. My mother would not behave like a
"good" hospice patient. She would not go without a fight, and Dr. Maris gave
her one. Dr. Maris told me that the cells were a gift, wasted on my mother
since she could not be saved. My mother joked about Dr. Maris's black clothes
and unrelenting efforts to close the Final Sale, until, eventually, leukemia had
the final say.
Did Dr. Maris's efforts to reach this endpoint more quickly break faith with
her profession's Hippocratic Oath of fidelity to patients? Maybe my mother
was not entitled to the clotting cells, since Medicare's hospice benefit covered
only supportive end-of-life care. 2 And maybe Dr. Maris thus had no duty to
provide them. If so, then perhaps Dr. Maris's penchant for reading readiness to
die into whatever my mother said did not matter. Maybe my mother simply
contracted out of any "right" to the clotting cells-or consented to Dr. Maris's
clinical judgment about what constitutes supportive care-when she decided to
use Medicare's hospice benefit. Or, maybe she kept telling Dr. Maris one thing
and me another. Of one thing, though, I am sure. I felt less trust for Dr. Maris
when I learned that the clotting treatments were a money-losing proposition.
I. TRUST, BETRAYAL, AND CONTRACT IN THE HEALTH SPHERE

Anecdotes, of course, make bad policy, as both the left and the right are
wont to point out when gripping stories go against them. 3 Yet in recent years,

2. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395d(d)(2)(A)(ii)(1), 1395f(a)(7)(A), 1395x(dd)(1)(E) (West
2002).
3. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 804-07

(1998) (describing examples of anecdotes used by politicians and advocates to gain support
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the nation has seen a proliferation of stories of breach of trust, 4 in the business
and public sectors as well as in the health sphere. At Enron, WorldCom, and
other firms, corporate fiduciaries-officers and directors-betrayed the faith of
shareholders and employees by misstating earnings, unloading stock based on
inside knowledge, and turning a blind eye toward bad behavior. 5 The
accounting industry's wholesale complicity in this misconduct 6 undermined
investor confidence in corporate financial reporting to a degree that has reduced
the market value of publicly traded firms overall. 7 Perceptions that Enron and
other firms buy unfair political influence through "soft money" campaign
contributions rose to a crescendo that, in 2002, produced campaign finance
reform. 8 In the health sector, revelations that managed care executives profited
from withholding clinical services led to high-profile, nine-figure jury verdicts
against health plans 9 and fed growing popular backlash against managed care.10
for their policy proposals); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REv.
471, 474-84 (1997) (cataloguing false assumptions and stereotypes that underlay the 1996
welfare reform legislation); Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamps Program: How it Grew and
How Reagan Wants to Cut It Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1981, § 1, at 11 (reporting on
President Reagan's rhetorical use of negative stories about people receiving welfare).
4. I refer to trust here in a broad sense, encompassing a range from the deeply felt,
mutual faith experienced by people in loving relationships and close friendships to the
dispassionate, even "calculative" trust or confidence that facilitates business dealings among
strangers and casual acquaintances. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and
Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 463-84 (1993) (discussing multiple
understandings of trust).
5. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Overview, Enron Panel
Finds Inflated Profits and Self-Dealing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 1, at 1 (describing a
report concluding that Enron "executives intentionally manipulated the company's profits,
inflating them by almost $1 billion in the year before Enron's collapse through byzantine
dealings with a group of partnerships"); Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It
Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al (reporting
on WorldCom's announcement that "it had overstated its cash flow by more than $3.8 billion
during the last five quarters"); Simon Romero, Reports of Shredding Intensify Global
Crossing Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at ClI (reporting on Global Crossing's
"acknowledgment that employees at several of its offices had shredded documents after the
Securities and Exchange Commission began investigating the company in February").
6. See Carrie Johnson & Peter Behr, Andersen Guilty of Obstruction;Accounting Firm
Will End Audit Work, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at Al ("Andersen, as Enron's auditor,
signed off on financial statements that obscured billions of dollars in debts and losses at the
energy-trading giant .... ).
7. See Alex Berenson, The Nation: Oversight; The Biggest Casualty of Enron's
Collapse: Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, § 4, at 1 ("Already, even a hint of an
accounting irregularity can cause Wall Street to flee a company's bonds and stocks en
masse."); Gretchen Morgenson, What If Investors Won't Join the Party?, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2002, § 3, at 1 ("The steady stream of accounting scandals, corporate chicanery and
questionable practices at Wall Street firms is taking a toll on investor confidence-and that
has major implications for the stock market as a whole.").
8. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
9. See, e.g., $120 Million Award Against Aetna Stands, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at
C2.
10. Mark A. Peterson, Introduction: Politics, Misperception, or Apropos?, 24 J.
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The trustworthiness of physicians who receive monetary rewards for
withholding costly treatments has become a focus of federal and state
litigation. "
A.

The ContractarianChallenge to Trust-SupportingLegal Rules

Whether these accounts of breach of faith and loss of confidence reflect a
real drop in trust and trustworthiness or increased attention to longstanding
phenomena is unclear. 12 Either way, they come at an embarrassing point for
many legal scholars. For a generation or more, writers in the Chicagoan
tradition have challenged traditional limits on actors' ability to contract out
of-or otherwise escape-legal rules that purport to safeguard trustworthiness.
In the business law context, some commentators have urged that corporate
officers and directors be permitted to opt out of fiduciary duties. 13 Capital
markets, these scholars contend, can be counted upon to select the most
efficient management and board oversight practices, and legal rules aimed at
preserving trust too often stand in the way. The contractarian critique of trustHEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 873, 875-76 (1999). Since the late 1990s, erosion of trust has been
a central theme in press coverage of the health care industry. See, e.g., Marketplace
Features: Trust in the MedicalRealm (WGBH radio broadcast, June 26-28, 2002), available
at http://marketplace.org/features/trust.
Negative characterizations of managed care
bureaucrats have also become a staple in popular entertainment. See, e.g., JOHN Q
(Evolution Entertainment 2002).
II. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 216 (2000) (concerning whether
HMOs breach their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) by offering physicians financial incentives to limit medical care); Shea v. Esensten,
622 N.W.2d 130, 134-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning whether a medical malpractice
plaintiff can introduce evidence bearing on physicians' financial incentives). For discussions
of judicial treatment of financial incentives to practice medicine more frugally, see PETER D.
JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 22249 (2002); M. Gregg Bloche & Peter D. Jacobson, The Supreme Court and Bedside
Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776, 2776-79 (2000); Peter J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On
Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 767, 769-76 (2001).
12. There has been much discussion in recent years concerning the so-called "bowling
alone" hypothesis, the proposition that America's stock of "social capital"-our degree of
civic engagement, social connectedness, and interpersonal trust-has been in decline for the
past fifty years or more.

See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE

(presenting exhaustive evidence
of such decline).
13. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71 (1990) ("[C]orporate rules
ultimately are and, from an efficiency perspective, should be the product of private ordering,
not government regulation. Even where liability rules are appropriate, they should be
regarded as standard form contractual provisions that can be drafted around."); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 401-03
(1983) (asserting that "[t]he standby rule of corporate law, the fiduciary principle, requires
actors to behave in the way that they would have agreed to do by contract, if detailed
contracts could be reached and enforced at no cost").
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)
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supporting legal norms has extended to the intimate sphere. Family law
doctrines that limit free movement into and out of loving commitment have
been condemned as obstacles to personal fulfillment. 14
Nowhere has the contractarian attack on trust-supporting legal rules been
stronger, or more successful in changing the law, than it has been in the health
sphere. Since the mid- 1970s, market-oriented scholars have challenged a broad
range of legal principles previously assumed to sustain the trustworthiness of
physicians and health systems. Doctrines shielding physicians from antitrust
law, insulating them from insurers' and hospitals' influence over clinical
practice, and reinforcing the precept of undivided clinical loyalty to patients
came under attack as protection for the medical profession at consumers'
expense. 15 These scholars, including Clark Havighurst, Richard Epstein, and
Mark Hall, urge contractual ordering of clinical standards of care; 16
relationships among physicians, hospitals, and health care payers; 17 and
physicians' conflicting obligations to patients, payers, and other third parties. 18
Although courts have not embraced this approach wholesale, they have
pushed health care law far in this direction since the 1970s. The United States
Supreme Court's 1975 rejection of a "learned professions" exemption from
federal antitrust law 19 not only commenced a judicial offensive against
physicians' efforts to limit price competition; 20 it opened the way for use of
antitrust doctrine to stop professional self-regulation of physicians' business
relationships. 2 1 Courts have eviscerated laws barring lay management of
medical decisionmaking, 22 allowed insurers to offer financial rewards to
14. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS
MARRIAGE 33-86 (1999) (criticizing contractarian approaches to marriage and divorce).

O

15. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health
Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849
(1981); Clark C. Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues andAnswers,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1981); Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust
Perspective on TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071 (1984).
16. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 227-62 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (1976); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost

Containmentand the Standardof Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1745-63 (1987).
17. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 447-49 (1988).
18. Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 699700 (1994).

19. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-93 (1975) (holding that providers
of professional services engage in "trade or commerce" and are thus subject to federal
antitrust law).

20. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 939, 941 (2001).

21. Peter J. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform. Arrow, Coase, and the Changing
Structure of the Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL &
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 113-157 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2002).

22. Adam M. Freiman, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of
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physicians for withholding costly tests and treatments, 23 and empowered
employee benefits managers and health plans to contract for standards of care
24
below those set by the medical profession.
This contractarian remodeling of the law of health care provision entailed
rejection of an older wisdom. The older wisdom drew a distinction between
medical professionalism and the rule of the marketplace, disdained economic
competition as beneath professional dignity, demanded that physicians adhere
to an ethic of fidelity to patients regardless of self-interest, and insisted on
professional insulation from lay influences (public or private) on clinical
judgment. 25 Adherents held that this understanding of professional obligation
protected patients against exploitation, rewarded physicians with social respect,
and thereby sent patients a strong message of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness
mattered, this story held, because it encouraged patients to volunteer intimate
facts about their lives, cooperate with diagnosis and treatment, draw
reassurance from medical explanations, and experience the doctor-patient
relationship itself as empowering and comforting.
A classic article by Kenneth Arrow forty years ago conceptualized this
thinking in economic terms. 26 Arrow argued, in essence, that physicians'
anticompetitive cultural norms and ethic of fidelity to patients were a social
welfare-enhancing response to the problem of information imbalance between
medically ignorant patients and comparatively well-informed physicians. 27 The
ethic of self-sacrificing fidelity reduced the risk of opportunistic exploitation of
this knowledge asymmetry, Arrow held. By signaling their commitment to this
ethic, he contended, physicians assuaged patients' fears of being exploited; this
encouraged patients to rely upon and benefit from medical care. 28 Signaling
behaviors were crucial to Arrow's account. Prohibitions against overt profitseeking, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and provision of charity care sent the

Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care
Environment, 47 EMORY L.J. 697, 704-12 (1998).

23. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that treatment
decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary acts under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and therefore rejecting claim that giving financial rewards to these
physicians for frugal practice breaches ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions); Neade v. Portes,
739 N.E.2d 496, 499-502 (Ill. 2000) (holding that giving financial rewards to physicians for
frugal practice does not breach these physicians' common law fiduciary duties).
24. The United States Supreme Court's two major opinions on managed care, Pegram,
530 U.S. 211, and Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002), indicate
that if restrictions on medical coverage and care are set forth explicitly in ERISA plan
descriptions, they are immune from challenge under state tort law (which typically defers to
professional custom to set standards of care).
25. See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-65 (1951).
26. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).

27. Id. at 965-66.
28. Id.
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message that medicine was worthy of trust as a culture apart from the self29
seeking mores of the marketplace.
Contemporary market-oriented scholars of health law and policy reject
Arrow's account as "layered in amber" 30-dated
by its inattention to
professional self-interest and its deference to professional norms against
advertising and entrepreneurship. In support of their contractarian policy
prescriptions, they point to the self-serving features of professional constraints
on consumer choice, and they contend that the information asymmetry Arrow
described no longer merits (if it ever did) privileging professional norms over
health care buyers' choices. 3 1 These choices, made before the onset of medical
need, from among health plans with competing approaches to management of
care and costs, honor consumers' tradeoffs between medical care and other
32
wants and needs, the contractarian story holds.
B.

Selfishness-SuppressingNorms and the Case Against Contract

These contractarian authors are at a loss to explain the popular backlash
against managed care-and its intrusions upon professional authority-that
began in the mid-1990s. They condemn political candidates' anti-HMO
rhetoric, large jury verdicts against health plans, and aggressive state
regulators, 33 but they offer no accounting for the rising anger that generated
these responses. Nor have they engaged a growing body of research on the
psychology of trust, altruism, and health risk that casts doubt on the
contractarian paradigm for health law. This work suggests that making some
commitments and behaviors a matter of choice, rather than status-based
obligations, can interfere with the cognitive and emotional processes by which
people hold to their commitments. Structures of moral belief (and feelings

29. Arrow's account of information asymmetry (concerning medicine's biological
efficacy) as the source of patients' desire for professional trustworthiness left out the
affective and intrinsic dimension-patients' yearning for support, comfort, and
empowerment through emotional connection with their physicians. M. Gregg Bloche, The
Marketfor Medical Ethics, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1099, 1108 (2001).
30. Peter J. Hammer, Deborah Haas-Wilson & William M. Sage, Kenneth Arrow and
the Changing Economics of Health Care. "Why Arrow? Why Now?," 26 J. HEALTH POL.

POL'Y & L. 835, 835 (2001).
31.

E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE NEW

MEDICAL MARKETPLACE (2001); James C. Robinson, The End of Asymmetric Information, 26
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1045, 1051-52 (2001); see also Frank A. Sloan, Arrow's
Concept of the Health Care Consumer: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 899, 910 (2001) (urging that health policy and law not treat consumer ignorance
as a given, and instead take up the challenge of making medical consumers into betterinformed decisionmakers).
32. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 65-76 (1997).
33. Id. at 425-29; David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a
Maul, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1061 (1999).
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about these beliefs34) are to some degree rigid. 35 Allowing some elements to
vary, via contract, can make these structures less stable, eroding people's
capacity to honor their commitments. This has troublesome implications for
people's trust, trustworthiness, and reliability when matters of duty are made
into matters of choice.
Do these implications imperil the contractarian vision of health law and
policy? Outside the health sphere, contract-skeptics argue that the new learning
about the psychology and economic value of trustworthiness weighs against
permitting parties to contract out of extant norms of fidelity. 36 "Progressive"
corporate law scholars stress the central role of cooperative social norms in

negotiating the myriad prisoner's dilemma situations that pose obstacles to
value-adding collaboration

shareholders. 37

between

a firm's employees,

managers,

and

These norms, they contend, are powerfully reinforced by

fiduciary and other legal principles from which corporate stakeholders cannot
contractually depart. 38 Legal enforcement of these principles, the argument
holds, plays less of a role in giving them effect than does their internalization

by corporate agents and stakeholders. 39 Deterrence via legal threat--or even
through informal sanctions like fear of retaliation or loss of reputation-is not

34. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND
THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994) (discussing the influence of affect on people's beliefs and
judgments); George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Ned Welch,
Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001) (arguing that feelings mediate the
connection between cognitive evaluations of risk and risk-related behavior).
35. See Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic
Analysis, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 1, 27-37 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis
Putterman eds., 1998) (arguing the "psychological traits may well occur in bundles of
expressed behavior that are not decomposable" and that some "components" of a bundle that
is favored by biological or cultural selection pressure may, by themselves, be maladaptive).
For a comprehensive review of the role of such structural constraints in biological evolution,
see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2002).

This

structuralist approach to thinking about social (and biological) change is at odds with welfare
economists' propensity to formulate functionalist rationales for all behavior, without regard
for possible limits on its "decomposibility."
36. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted,81 B.U. L. REV.
591 (2001).
37. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999). These prisoner's dilemma situations include the agency cost problems muchdiscussed in corporate law (arising from managers', directors', and employees' incentives to
further their own interests at the firm's expense) and the so-called "team production"
problem-the mutual reluctance of a firm's agents and stakeholders to invest effort and
money in common endeavors that render the participants vulnerable to each others'
opportunism. Not all collaboration, of course, adds value from an overall social welfare
perspective: Antitrust and anticorruption measures aim to reduce socially destructive
collaboration.
38. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1785-89 (2001).
39. Id. at 1793-96.
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nearly as important an influence on behavior as is the adoption of cooperative
norms as personal preferences.40 Through symbolic affirmation of these
norms, law sends the message that a firm's participants ought to adopt them as
preferences. 4 1 Allowing corporate agents and stakeholders to contract out of
fiduciary duties would deliver the contrary message that nonadoption is an
acceptable choice. This not only undermines belief in the "rightness" of the
particular fiduciary duties at issue; it risks weakening the psychological
42
mechanisms that inculcate selfishness-suppressing norms more generally.
C.

Ex Ante Choices and "LaterSelves "

This case against contract, when selfishness-suppressing norms are at stake
and the possibilities for opportunism are great, poses a large challenge for
proponents of market ordering in the medical realm. This challenge is all the
greater because of a feature of health care contracts that distinguish them from
other market-mediated commitments, including corporate governance. More
than any other contractual commitments, the medical coverage arrangements
defended by proponents of market ordering deny what Jon Elster calls the
freedom of choice of "later selves." ' 43 These arrangements cope with one of
40. Id. at 1794-98. Some skeptics of law's capacity to encourage people to adopt
cooperative norms as personal preferences argue that law's coercive force "crowds out"
people's inclination toward voluntary cooperation. See infra text accompanying notes 12438.
41. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996) (exploring law's possibilities and limits as a tool for inculcating normative beliefs).
42. This line of argument conflates two sorts of preferences--desire and a sense of
duty. Its proponents point to a body of behavioral science research consistent with the
proposition that people manifest distinct, "self-regarding" and cooperative (or "otherregarding") personalities, elicited by different environmental cues and contexts. See Blair &
Stout, supra note 38, at 1759-80 (reviewing experimental studies of cooperative and trusting
behavior in different social contexts). Our "other-regarding" self, the argument holds,
genuinely wants what is good for the other. The sense of duty, by contrast, often runs
contrary to our desires. Cf Jane Mansbridge, Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of
Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in EcONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION,
supra note 35, at 151, 155-62 (distinguishing between the capacity "to make another's good
one's own" and the capacity "to act against one's preferences on the ground that one ought
so to act"). This distinction is important for the law, since different mental mechanisms are
affected differently by the law's intervention. Behavioral science is agnostic as to mental
mechanisms, but psychoanalytic models hold that distinct mechanisms are involved in (1)
the empathic connection that activates our "other-regarding" self and (2) the self-denying,
judgmental psychology of duty. An illustration, all too timely, is the corporate official who
is drawn, out of concern for a colleague, into complicity in misstating earnings but who loses
sleep at night over the tension between this "other-regarding" preference and her duty to
shareholders. In general, law's impersonality and coerciveness make it a poor tool for
encouraging behaviors that are engendered by empathic connection with others. These
characteristics of law, though, make it a better tool for supporting behaviors that arise from a
tough-minded sense of duty.
43. Jon Elster, Introduction to THE MULTIPLE SELF I (Jon Elster ed., 1985); M. Gregg
Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
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health care policy's central dilemmas, the management of costs in the face of
the "moral hazard" of insurance, by precommitting health care purchasers to
methods of spending restraint that apply when illness arises. All contracts, of
course, involve a measure of precommitment to behavioral constraints. But the
precommitment called for in medical coverage contracts is unique. Consumers
agree, when they buy coverage (typically while healthy), to limits that apply
most poignantly to profoundly different "later selves." 44 Mere apprehension of
serious illness transforms us: It makes us afraid and causes us to regress to
childlike states of dependence and wishful thinking. 4 5 Diagnosis of serious
illness furthers this transformation, as do disabling symptoms.
Health care contractarians point to this transformation as good reason for
holding the sick to their ex ante choices. Consumers choosing from among
medical coverage plans reside behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, uncertain
about their future health needs. 46 Cost-conscious purchasing decisions made
from behind this veil, contractarians hold, are fairer measures of people's costbenefit tradeoffs than are the retrospective wishes of sick patients who have lost
their bets and want to escape the consequences. 4 7 But the transformation
involved is more than mere ex post regret after loss of a gamble. The fear and
regression it entails create "later selves" with quite different preferences and
felt needs-needs not imagined ex ante. Whether holding these "later selves"
to the consequences of ex ante health care choices furthers or reduces either
48
social welfare or personal autonomy is an open question.
44. The marriage contract arguably equals or exceeds health insurance in its
precommitment of very different "later selves." But in the United States and many other
nations, unilateral, "no-fault" exit from marriage is an option, typically available without the
need to pay contractual damages. This attenuation of the law's protection for reliance
interests in marriage has ensued from divorce law's heightened concern for the freedom of
choice of "later selves."
45. Eugene Halpert, Asclepius: Magic in Transference to Physicians, 63
PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 733, 751-54 (1994); Herman Nunberg, Psychological Interrelations
Between Physician and Patient, 25 PSYCHOANALYTIC REv. 297, 300 (1938); William M.
Zinn, Transference Phenomena in Medical Practice: Being Whom the Patient Needs, 113
ANNALS INTERNAL MED.293, 295 (1990).

46. This veil is to some degree translucent (unlike a true Rawlsian veil of ignorance),
since many consumers know something about their future health needs, owing to family
histories, lifestyle, and environmental risks, and chronic conditions already diagnosed.
Adverse selection ensuing from this knowledge is a major source of medical insurance
market failure. Sherry Glied, Managed Care, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 707,
721-23 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
47. EPSTEIN, supra note 32; at 68-69.
48. Health care contractarians answer emphatically that privileging medical
consumers' ex ante choices both respects their autonomy and makes medical resource
allocation more rational. The Rawlsian veil of ignorance argument, they contend, favors the
ex ante vantage point as the locus of consumers' most reasonable, dispassionate health care
choices, and a robust conception of personal autonomy and responsibility demands that sick
patients be held to these ex ante choices. An alternative view holds that our transformed
"later selves" merit at least equal regard as persons-perhaps greater regard because of what
they have come to know and feel-and that giving the ex ante perspective trump authority
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This discussion presumes all parties' ability to determine, with clarity, the
ex post medical consequences of health care consumers' ex ante choices. But
such clarity is often absent. Uncertainty and ensuing discretion pervade the
determination of health care benefits. 49 The "medical necessity" standard that
is a staple of health insurance contracts defers to physician practice norms to
Doctors' practice styles, however, vary widely:
determine coverage. 50
Different physicians commonly evaluate and treat clinically similar patients in
very different ways. More often than not, the available scientific data cannot
resolve the question of which of multiple therapeutic (or diagnostic) methods is
most effective, let alone shed light on the comparative cost-benefit profiles of
alternative methods. 51 Thus the "medical necessity" test for coverage provides

opaque cover for enormous discretion-and a wide opening for insurer
opportunism. More pointed contractual guidance conceming cost-benefit
tradeoffs (e.g., maximum dollar amounts payable to save a quality-adjusted life
year 52) could in theory reduce the scope of insurers' discretion, but the paucity
of scientific measures of expected therapeutic :efficacy 53 would ensure
continued wide discretion in practice.
therefore undermines respect for personal autonomy. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY & IRRATIONALITY 36-65 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing
cognitive mechanisms involved in precommitment and considering ethical issues posed by
subsequent preference change). Conflict between these approaches to the ethical priority of
ex ante versus ex post medical choices underlies a variety of controversies in the law of
health care provision, including the debate over whether informed consent law should
require disclosure of all medically accepted diagnostic and therapeutic options (however
defined) or merely all options provided by a health plan.
49. See Bloche, supra note 43.
50. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2170 (2002)
(concluding that independent review of HMO determinations of medical necessity, under
state laws mandating such review, relies upon physicians' professional judgment and is akin
to a medical "second opinion"). Specific coverage exclusions (e.g., those for investigational
treatments, mental illness, or organ transplants) leave less room for uncertainty and insurer
discretion. But the considerable volume of litigation concerning these exclusions confirms
that they hardly eliminate uncertainty and discretion. See, e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 310-11 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting insurer's characterization of organic
brain syndrome as a "mental illness" on ground that the term "mental illness" as used in the
insurance contract to limit benefits was ambiguous and should therefore be construed in
favor of the insured); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 426 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that there were material issues of fact as to whether insurer's characterization
of in vitro fertilization as "experimental" and thus not covered was arbitrary).
51. See Bloche, supra note 43.
52. Characterization of health care's benefits in terms of quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) is broadly appealing to health economists because it folds medical care's myriad
subjective benefits into a single metric that also incorporates extension of life. But the task
of valuing these subjective benefits-such things as pain relief, reassurance, and levels of
physical and psychological functioning-is fraught with indeterminacies and moral
dilemmas. Id. For discussion of fairness issues posed by the QALY approach, see A.
Williams, Economics, QALYs, and Medical Ethics: A Health Economist's Perspective, 1
JOURNAL D'EcONOMIE MEDICALE 49 (1997).

53. Commentators on health law and policy often urge a robust program of publicly
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Opportunism and the "Trust Problem"

Discretion, poorly scrutinized, invites opportunism, 54 and for the reasons
reviewed above, sick people are singularly ill-situated to monitor the exercise
of medical discretion. Health care contractarians have offered no answer to this
monitoring problem aside from calls for better-informed patients and medical
55
Selfishness-suppressing requirements-fiduciary obligation,
purchasers.
56
duties of good faith, and other cooperation-favoring principles -are the law's
classic response to such monitoring problems. If the emerging psychological
understanding of how these legal requirements shape behavior is correct, they
work in large measure by inducing target subjects to internalize selfishnesssuppressing norms.
People who internalize a set of norms believe that these norms are right or
good, and that violating them is wrong. 57 They do not see themselves as
and/or privately funded clinical outcomes research to close the gap in our knowledge about
the efficacy of medical care. Serious obstacles confront such a program. The "gold
standard" for such research is the randomized, controlled clinical trial. Retrospective studies
draw upon preexisting clinical data, which are often collected inconsistently, on-the-fly, with
insurance reimbursement and liability avoidance in mind. They are thus more likely to
detect false correlations and to miss true causal connections, and they do not permit isolation
of particular variables for manipulation and measurement. Prospective, controlled trials
reduce these sources of error by allowing researchers to hold background variables more or
less constant (through selection of clinically homogeneous patients), permitting the
researchers to vary (in consistent fashion) only one or a few experimental factors, and
allowing consistent measurement of preselected dependent (outcome) variables.
But these advantages come at great cost. The need for clinically homogeneous patients
often excludes most of those for whom a treatment under study might be appropriate. This
makes clinical trial results dubiously relevant for many, perhaps most, "real world" patients.
Moreover, such research is often enormously expensive, owing to the large sample sizes
(and collaboration between multiple research centers) necessary to detect small differences
in the efficacy of treatment alternatives. In addition, current ethical rules prohibit use of
clinical trials to measure the therapeutic value added by a more costly treatment option, once
the more costly option has been determined to be more effective (in an absolute sense).
Meanwhile, poorly tested, technology-intensive therapies proliferate, nurtured by widespread
feelings that insurers should cover hope-giving, potentially life-saving innovations without
begrudging their cost. It is therefore unlikely that clinical outcomes research will ever
provide decisive scientific answers to more than a small portion of the medical questions
doctors face in their daily practice. Bloche, supra note 43.
54. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character & Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1991)
(analyzing fiduciary duties in diverse legal spheres as policy responses to inability to
monitor or control agents' exercise of discretion).
55. Id.

56. Another example is nonprofit corporation law's proscription against distributing
earnings to stakeholders. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 838, 843-45 (1980) (arguing that the nonprofit form's bar against distribution
of an enterprise's income except as reasonable compensation for goods, services, or money
loaned protects the enterprise's patrons-its customers or donors-against opportunism
arising from patrons' inability to monitor the enterprise's outputs).
57. Some psychoanalytic theorists have modeled commitment to professional norms as
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choosing to adopt these norms, any more than a person of religious faith sees
herself as choosing to believe that God exists. A person might wish to become
a religious believer, and she thus might elect to undergo a series of
experiences-attending church services, for example-in the hope of
eventually acquiring faith in God. But as Bernard Williams has noted, one
cannot both believe something to be true (e.g., that God exists) and think that
this belief ensues from a decision to adopt it.58 The initial decision to adopt the
belief must somehow submerge below the Waterline of conscious awareness.
Belief that something is true or right is antithetical to the idea that the belief at
issue is a choice from among acceptable options.
Allowing individuals to contract out of a legal duty thus subverts the law's
message that the rule imposing the duty is right. This, in turn, undermines the
legal duty's power to shape beliefs and behavior. There is a crucial spillover
effect here. The very existence of an option to exit from a legal duty subverts

59
the duty's behavioral influence, even for those who do not opt out.
Permitting individuals or firms to contract out of fiduciary or other selfishnesssuppressing duties thus imperils industrywide commitment to the cooperative
behaviors these duties affirm. Health care contractarians have not answered
this far-reaching challenge. The "trust problem," as Mark Hall notes in his
groundbreaking article, Law, Medicine, and Trust, "is a fundamental obstacle to
actualizing market advocates' vision of how health law and medical markets
' '60
should function.

an entirely noncognitive process, arising from the experience of hierarchy during
professional socialization. Eric Marcus has observed that professional trainees are put at the
bottom of a hierarchy and expected to obey. To the trainee, Marcus says, the ultimate threat
is made plain: "You do this because I say so. I know more than you. If you disobey I will
end your career!" Eric Marcus, The Role of Liaison Psychiatry in the Clinical Training of
Medical Students: A Psychoanalytic Approach, in CONSULTATION-LIAISON PSYCHIATRY:
CURRENT TRENDS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 267, 274 (Jerry B. Finkel ed., 1983). Confronted

(for the most part unconsciously) with this threat, the trainee yields, unconsciously
incorporating her superiors' mores and norms into her own value system. The result is a
system of normative belief less responsive to subsequent learning and experience than are
beliefs adopted consciously, in a more cognitive or rational manner. One could complement
Marcus's account of norm inculcation via hierarchy and threat with a parallel, equally
noncognitive account of norm adoption via group membership, fear of being cut off from
webs of connectedness among peers, and ensuing incorporation of group norms. Norms
inculcated in this fashion will be similarly resistant to subsequent experience. These
noncognitive methods of learning prepare trainees well to resist subsequent pressures
(financial and otherwise) from private or state institutions to act improperly (assuming that
the norms inculcated are the appropriate reference point for assessing the propriety of the
conduct at issue). They are, however, poor preparation for the exercise of independent,
critical judgment amidst promotional claims by pharmaceutical firms, medical equipment
manufacturers, managed health plans, hospitals, and other service suppliers.
58. BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136-51 (1973) (discussing paradoxes

involved in the notion of "deciding to believe").
59. See sources cited supra note 37.
60. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REv. 463, 497 (2002).
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II.. CAN THE CASE FOR CONTRACT BE SAVED?

Can the case for contract be saved? Hall's article is a bold attempt to do
so. To this end, he takes the measure of the new behavioral science thinking
about law's connection to unselfish conduct. His perspective is hardly
disinterested. Hall may be the most radical of the health care contractarians,
and he is surely the most original. In a provocative body of work over the past
fifteen years, he has argued not only for stratified levels of care linked to
willingness (and ability) to pay-and for a hands-off regulatory stance toward
health plans' management practices and contractual exclusions 6 1-but also for
giving physicians primary responsibility for health care rationing. 62 His case
for bedside rationing by doctors and against laws mandating disclosure of
health plans' financial rewards to physicians for withholding care sets him
apart from most health care contractarians.
Richard Epstein, 63 Clark
64
65
Havighurst, and others emphasize the ex ante specification of cost-benefit
tradeoff rules and strict adherence to these rules-by health plans, doctors, and
patients-when medical need arises. They aspire to constrain clinical
discretion, whereas Hall seizes upon this discretion as a cost control
opportunity. Doctors are better positioned than utilization managers to weigh
costs against potential benefits for individual patients, he argues, and detailed
rules are an obstacle to achieving the efficiencies that bedside discretion offers.
Hall's cost-containment program pointedly rejects the traditional medical ethics
premise that the doctor has a duty of fidelity to her patients. 66 And his program
is endangered, indeed ruled out, by the legal persistence, let alone

61. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1684-85 (1992).
62. Hall, supranote 18, at 699.
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 59-76.
64. HAVIGHURST, supra note 16, at 185-200.
65. Other influential contractarian voices in the health sphere include E. Haavi
Morreim, James Blumstein, Alan Sykes, and David Hyman. See generally MORREIM, supra
note 31; James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 (1994);
Richard A. Epstein & Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability,
ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625 (2001); Hyman, supra note
33.
66. The physician, for Hall, should have no personal loyalty or particularized concern
for her patient-no moral bias toward her patient's needs when they are weighed against the
needs of others in the insurance risk pool. Hall's physician-rationer should be loyal to the
risk pool. There is a paradox here. Hall endorses financial rewards to physician-rationers
for withholding care: Indeed this is his contractarian tool for attracting doctors to the
resource allocation role he envisions for them. Hall approves of physician responsiveness to
these incentives: His allocative strategy is to get these incentives "right" from a utilitarian
perspective. Thus the physician, it would seem, has no moral duty to the risk pool after all,
any more than she has a duty of loyalty to her patients. She is morally free to respond, like
any other seller, to the market's material possibilities. Indeed, Hall's cost containment
vision relies on her doing so.
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strengthening, of physicians' fiduciary obligations to patients. Hall therefore
has even more at stake than do other health care contractarians in the debate
over the future of fiduciary and other selfishness-suppressing legal duties.
A.

Is There a Crisis of Trust?

Hall's article is a work of extraordinary reach. It engages large bodies of
scholarly and empirical literature on trust and cooperation in the health sphere
and more generally. It applies insights from this literature to broad areas of the
law of health care provision and to other bodies of law that bear on trust. It is
carefully hedged. Hall is superb at anticipating his critics, and the propositions
he advances about the law are framed in disarmingly tentative fashion. Hall,
though, has a core message. It is: (1) that much of what law does, or might do,
to enhance actors' trustworthiness and to nurture trust is unnecessary or even
corrosive of trust; and (2) that where the law takes a hands-off stance toward
the health care industry, this stance is both explicable and justifiable as a
response to an excess of trust and to a consequent risk of overreaction to
betrayal. Trust and trustworthiness, in short, are not in particularly short
supply. To the contrary, Hall claims, trust is commonly present in excess.
Regulation of the medical marketplace, and other markets, is therefore often
unneeded on trust-related grounds. And, when trust is desirable, regulation
frequently undermines it.
Basing the case against regulation on a surfeit of trust is a novel approach.
The claim that regulation undermines trust and trustworthiness when they are in
limited supply and worth preserving has been made before by market-oriented
scholars. 67 But the notion that concerns about loss of trust are overblown is
contrary to standard wisdom in health care 68 and other policy spheres. And the
proposition that trust is in excess supply is rarely heard, outside the contexts of
public corruption, 69 antitrust law, and other precincts that pose the problem of
cooperation among some at the expense of the welfare of the many.
Is Hall's rebuilt case for contract-and against most extant and proposed
regulatory constraints on market ordering in the medical sphere-persuasive?
Its derring-do is sure to cheer free marketeers, dispirited in recent years by
67. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1131,
1140-41 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553, 576-86 (2001).
68. See, e.g., David Mechanic, The Functionsand Limitations of Trust in the Provision

of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 661, 661-62 (1998) (discussing the threats
HMOs pose to patients' trust in their physicians); David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The
Impact of Managed Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275

JAMA 1693 (1996) (warning that close association between physicians and managed care
organizations can erode patients' trust in their physicians).
69. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The PoliticalEconomy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION

AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 49 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (analyzing corruption
as, in part, a problem of superoptimal levels of trust within networks of public officials who
are complicit in illicit self-dealing).
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rising managed care backlash. It is equally certain to disturb those who resist
market allocation of health care in general. But ideology aside, Hall's case is
deeply problematic, for reasons I will presently explain.
These reasons fall into two broad groups. First, his basic analytic
framework-placement of health care regulatory policies into three categories,
based on these policies' supposed relationship to trust 7 0 -entails a series of
assumptions about these policies that favor antiregulatory conclusions. Hall
neither defends these assumptions nor considers whether alternative
understandings of these policies' purposes and impact might lead to different
judgments about them. Second, social science findings about trust do not
clearly support (or, for that matter, refute) the antiregulatory message he
discerns in them. From a lawyer's perspective, a frustrating feature of research
in this area is that different study designs often yield conclusions that pull in
opposite policy directions. 7 1 For example, some research suggests that legal
requirements suppress people's cooperative inclinations, 72 while other studies
support the claim that law's expressive power can nurture cooperation. 73 The
behavioral science literature on trust and cooperation is open to criticism as a
jumble of insights in search of a paradigm. From this jumble, Hall picks and
chooses, in a manner consistent with his antiregulatory positions. He conveys
his choices in tentative prose, at times acknowledging that social science
insights might cut the other way. But these hedges do not divert him from
thumbs-down judgment of much that courts and regulators have done, or might
do. Moreover, he overreaches in inferring from survey research, including his
own, that patient trust is less vulnerable (and less in need of the law's support)
than most in the health sector believe. The surveys he cites do not support his
case, and other research results contradict it.
B.

The Relationship Between Health Care Law and Trust

Hall's division of health care law into three categories, based on averred
relationships between law and trust, is the foundation for his reconstruction of
Hall, supra note 60, at 485-86.
71. Strictly speaking, of course, accurately reported research findings-the data
themselves-do not contradict each other. If an experiment is precisely replicated, with
identical research subjects and under identical circumstances, it will yield the same results.
It is researchers' (or policy advocates') broader inferences from different results-results
arising from nonidentical study designs-that frequently contradict, or at least pull in
different directions. This problem is hardly limited to behavioral science research on trust; it
pervades the law's use of insights from the social sciences.
72. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In, 6
RATIONALITY & SOC'y 334 (1994) [hereinafter Frey, Intrinsic Motivation]; Bruno S. Frey,
Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-Out Effect, in EcONOMICS, VALUES, AND
ORGANIZATION, supra note 35, at 437 (hereinafter Frey, Institutions andMorale].
73. Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?: An Economic Analysis of
70.

InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1597-1600 (2000).

Dec. 2002]

TRUST AND BETRAYAL

the case for contract. His categories represent "stances that law can take
toward trust" 74-"predicated, '' "supportive," and "skeptical." 75 The predicated
stance treats trust as a problem. It takes the existence of trust as a given,
"inevitable for psychological reasons."'76 Because trust in health care providers
"exceed[s] rational expectations," 77 Hall contends, the task for law that adopts
this stance is to manage the disconnect between trust-inspired hopes and
disheartening reality. The supportive stance assumes-often inaccurately, Hall
says-that trust is more fragile. It treats trust as a virtue and tries to promote it,
through measures that foster trusting sentiments and trustworthy behavior. The
skeptical stance treats trust in health care payers and providers as undeserved
and looks to complement or replace trust with intrusive regulatory alternatives.
Hall places most managed care regulation, actual and proposed, 78 in this
category.
1.

Treatingtrust as aproblem.

Laws that treat trust as a problem target the tendency of trust to arouse
unrealistic expectations, Hall says. Because failure to meet these expectations
produces unrealistic disappointment, these laws punish violators in an
attenuated manner, to avoid treating them unfairly. Medical malpractice law is
Hall's primary example. It is intended, he asserts, to punish violations of trust.
It is "not plausibly meant to sustain trust or to restore it once it is violated. '79
Hall analyzes malpractice law's deference to professional custom through this
lens, contending that physician-set standards of care keep juries from imposing
idealized expectations on doctors and health plans. 80 He then extends this
interpretation to many of the doctrinal turns in medical tort law that health
plans and market-oriented scholars have urged over the past twenty years.
These include high barriers to punitive damages, frequent reduction of jury
verdicts, judicial reluctance to admit evidence of financial rewards for
withholding care, and resistance to suits for breach of fiduciary duty based on
such incentives. 8 1 These trends, Hall argues, are justifiable responses to
consumers' (and jurors') overreactions when they experience breaches of trust.

74. Hall, supra note 60, at 486.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 488.

77. Id.at 489.
78. This includes the competing "Patients' Bill of Rights" proposals now pending in
Congress, as well as managed care regulation at the state level.
79. Hall, supra note 60, at 491.
80. Hall notes that courts have not adopted a "reasonable physician" standard, which,
he avers, would "invite[] juries to impose their possibly unrealistic notions of what doctors
should be able to accomplish." Id.at 492.
81. Id. at 493-95.
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Medical tort law may, to some degree, serve a punitive function, arising
from the ideal of reciprocity between private parties. Some scholars argue that
this is or should be tort law's main purpose, and that courts should not weigh
social consequences that lie outside the lines of particular accident and injury
cases in need of resolution.8 2 This appears to be Hall's position-his basis for
saying that malpractice law is meant to punish breaches of trust and not to
preserve or rekindle trust. But the prevailing view is that the sole or primary
purpose of tort law is minimization of the social costs of injury.8 3 Tort law
looks forward, toward overall social well-being, not backward, toward settling
accounts for individual victims. To the extent that breach of trust is the type of
injury at issue in medical tort cases, social cost minimization requires the law to
focus on sustaining trust and trustworthiness. Hall's claim that malpractice law
is not "plausibly" meant to do this is unsupported by argument 84 and contrary
to the weight of recent tort jurisprudence. This jurisprudence takes the measure
of medical liability, including liability for harm ensuing from breaches of trust,
based on its ability to deter the type of injury at issue. 85 Hall offers no
assessment of the deterrence value of the liability rules he discusses. His
characterization of malpractice law as a response to patients' unrealistic, trustdriven expectations assumes away the need to do so.
Moreover, Hall's focus on trust disregards malpractice law's declared
deterrence target: bodily harm and the pain, suffering, and economic losses
that result from it. Evidence suggests that malpractice law sends a weak
deterrent signal, relative to the frequency of such harm. Studies comparing the
incidence of malpractice claims to the frequency of episodes of medical
negligence (as identified by research teams of medical record reviewers) have
found that only small fractions of the identified negligence episodes result in

82. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,

569-71 (1972).
83. Landmark works developing this position from different perspectives include
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179-83 (5th ed. 1998); and STEVEN

SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). During the second half of the
twentieth century, this utilitarian vision came to prevail, in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965) (especially in the Restatement's approaches to setting standards of care in
negligence cases, Sections 291-293, and determining reasonable levels of risk in products
liability cases, Section 402A) and appellate opinions on negligence and products liability
issues. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 178-79, 230-33 (1980) (discussing
rise of utilitarian approaches to tort law).
84. Hall's sole citation for this claim is to a quotation from Blackstone's
Commentaries, written two centuries before the turn in American tort doctrine toward the
utilitarian perspective. See Hall, supra note 60, at 491 (quoting Blackstone's assertion that
suits against physicians for "neglect or unskillful management" are allowed because such
failure "breaks the trust" placed in the physician).
85. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 70-73 (1991).
Strictly
speaking, increments of liability are desirable when their deterrence value outweighs their
associated social costs (including costs of care and legal and other transaction costs).
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malpractice claims. 86 Even smaller proportions of these identified episodes
lead to monetary settlements and judgments. 87 This evidence belies accounts
of a malpractice system at risk of running amok, driven by anger at health care
providers. 88 But malpractice law's underdeterrence of bodily harm and its
consequences is of little interest to Hall (at least in this article). By framing the
task of medical tort law as the buffering of plaintiffs' (and jurors')
overreactions to breaches of trust, he channels attention away from the law's
89
underreaction to medical injury.

Even if one were to accept Hall's characterization of the purpose of
malpractice law as the settling of accounts with betrayers of trust, his framing
of medical tort law's task as management of overreaction to betrayal would be
problematic. That sick patients can regress to childlike belief in medical
omnipotence that far exceeds rational expectations 90 is surely the case. Hall's

understanding of this distinguishes him from other health care contractarians.
They have been reluctant to acknowledge the transforming effects of illness on
people's preferences and on their capacities for reasoned decisionmaking. This
is hardly surprising: Contractarians fear this transformation's implications for
the perceived legitimacy of both ex ante and ex post consumer choices. Hall, in

86. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 22-25 (1985) (finding, based on review of medical records from 20,000

patients hospitalized in California in the mid-1970s, that only one tort claim was filed for
every ten episodes of negligence that resulted in disability); HARVARD MED. PRACTICE
STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION,

AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK

4-13, 11-4 (1990) (finding, based on review of

medical records from 31,000 hospitalizations in New York State in 1984, that only one tort
claim was filed for every eight potentially valid claims).
87. DANZON, supra note 86, at 25 (finding only one paid claim per 25 episodes of
negligence in California Study); HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 86, at 11-4
(estimating only one paidclaim per sixteen potentially valid claims in Harvard Study).
88. Hall concedes that the tort system fails to adequately detect medical negligence
overall, Hall, supra note 60, at 495, but his focus is on the tiny proportion of malpractice
cases that yield very large damage awards. He is persuasive in linking these large awards to
jurors' anger, but his ascription of this anger to betrayal of trust is speculation.
89. A thorough discussion of the causes of avoidable medical injury and of the law's
potential and limits as a tool for reducing the incidence of such injury is beyond my scope
here. For a state-of-the-art review of causes and correctives for medical error, from the
National Academies of Sciences, see generally COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE INAM.,
INST. OF MED., To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn,
Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000). Negligence doctrine is profoundly
flawed as a medical risk management tool and may not be worth preserving. See generally
DANZON, supra note 86 (discussing problems in the law's approach to specifying standards
of due care and compensable damages); WEILER, supra note 85 (suggesting that a no-fault
system would provide more effective prevention and more equitable compensation). But
there is some evidence that the intensity of the malpractice litigation threat and the
persistence of some of the legal rules opposed by market-oriented tort reformers have
modest preventive effects on the incidence of medical injury. WEILER, supra note 85, at 7092.
90. Hall, supra note 60, at 478.
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contrast, offers a nuanced discussion of this psychological transformation and
the resulting therapeutic and other benefits of trust. 9 1 He accepts that childlike
fantasies of doctors' omnipotence can have therapeutic value, akin to the
placebo effect, and that these fantasies can impart a sense of safety and
comfort. And I believe he is right (though I am biased by my self-interest in
this matter 92) to take the position that law should protect physicians against
patient backlash when fantasies of perfection and omnipotence go awry.
But there is a difference between taking care not to hold doctors hostage to
unrealistic expectations and countenancing interpersonal betrayal. Medical tort
law can accomplish the former, by deferring to professional standards of care
(as Hall suggests), or through a general reasonableness standard, with robust
judicial supervision of juries. Medical tort law need not do the latter. It can
defer to professional standards of care (or impose reasonableness through
judicial constraints on juries) while insisting on doctors' fidelity to patients.
Hall notes that revelations of financial incentives to withhold care have led to
large jury verdicts, presumably resulting from moral outrage. He says these
verdicts are overreactions to betrayal, and that law should avert this type of
overreaction through such means as not telling jurors about doctors' financial
incentives. This is a raw value judgment on Hall's part. Others, including
myself, would be more inclined to treat people's strong reactions to this kind of
betrayal as legitimate. To the extent that they are legitimate, law that aims to
settle accounts should be less reserved about punishing infidelity than Hall is
inclined to be.
Finally, Hall voices frustration over courts' refusal, so far, to agree to
lower standards of care for patients who subscribe to cheaper managed health
plans. 9 3 He ascribes this refusal to the law's concern with trust-inspired
expectations: Judges, he says, are inclined to vindicate expectations fed by
insurers' promises to provide care regardless of cost. Were HMOs to openly
proclaim their intent to ration care within their budgets (and were Americans to
accept the reality of medical resource scarcity), 94 trust-inspired expectations
91. Id. at 477-82.

92. From my time in clinical medicine, I remember well some of my patients'
unrealistic fantasies about what I could offer-and my worries about the prospect of
disappointing them.
93. Hall is a long-time supporter of stratified standards of care, based on ability and
willingness to pay for medical services.

See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Health Care Cost

Containment and the Stratification of Malpractice Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 501 (1990)
(arguing for judicial acceptance of economically stratified duties of care). This is a crucial
agenda item for health care contractarians, since it would enable doctors, hospitals, and
health plans to offer low-end care, at lower prices, without fear of ruinous liability. See, e.g.,
Epstein, supra note 16; cf Morreim, supra note 16 (criticizing proposals for the contractual
setting of standards of care but urging that health care providers be permitted to present
evidence of resource constraints to rebut the presumption of a unitary, professional standard
of care).
94. Writing two years ago for a unanimous United States Supreme Court, Justice David
Souter proclaimed that health care rationing was both inherent in the design of prepaid health
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would not be an obstacle to economically stratified malpractice standards. I
think Hall is right in predicting that honesty about rationing would take the
trust barrier out of the picture (or at least downsize it). But the question of
equity would remain. Hall's discussion of the law's resistance to stratified
standards of care fails even to acknowledge this question's relevance. To the
extent that Americans (including judges) conceive of medical care as a "merit
good," that is, a thing to be allocated in a manner decoupled from the
distribution of wealth, a shift to stratified standards of care would meet
resistance. There is surely some hypocrisy in this. As a nation, we have
declined, or failed, to provide medical insurance coverage for all. 95 And, as
health care contractarians often remind us, cheaper coverage, made possible by
lower standards of care, would make insurance more accessible. But the
uncovering of hypocrisy, arising from tension between our commitments to
economic liberty and equity, does not warrant removing equity from the
picture. It is in play, alongside trust, in the law's resistance to stratified
96
standards of care.
2.

Treatingtrust as a virtue.

While Hall speaks favorably of laws that, he holds, treat trust as a problem
and shield health care payers and providers from patients' trust-inspired
expectations, he is skeptical of laws that take a "supportive stance" toward
trust. Laws, actual and proposed, that he places in his supportive category treat
trust as both fragile and desirable. They are vigorously interventionist, since
they rest on the premise that market mechanisms cannot adequately safeguard
trust. Hall's principal examples are regulatory schemes aimed at protecting
medical information privacy and reducing health care providers' conflicts of
interest. 9 7 His main criticism of these regulatory approaches is that they are
plans and a matter of national policy (since Congress had enacted a statute fostering the
development of HMOs). Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220-22, 231-34 (2000). Justice
Souter's blunt talk about rationing provoked considerable press coverage. See, e.g., Robert
Pear, The R Word: Justice Souter Takes on a Health Care Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2000, § 4, at 3. But the balancing of benefits against costs and the withholding of beneficial
care to meet budgetary constraints are not yet acknowledged in health plan advertising or
subscriber contracts.
95. As of 2001, approximately forty million Americans lacked health insurance
coverage. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000, at http://www.
census.gov/hhes/hlthins/hlthinOO/hltOOasc.html (last revised Aug. 22, 2002).
96. It is, in truth, unlikely that people in low-end health plans, with bureaucratic

barriers to elite specialty care and/or primary care doctors with large financial incentives to
practice frugally, receive the same levels of care as do people in high-end plans. The law's
unitary standard of care may thus be a fiction. But, if so, it is a fiction that serves to reduce
the real gap between low-end and high-end levels of care.
97. He also examines physician-assisted suicide through this lens. See Hall, supra note
60, at 500-03. Space constraints preclude my considering this subject here, but were I to do
so, I would raise concerns similar to those that I take up in this Part.
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unneeded because trust is more resilient than is generally supposed. They
therefore impose pointless costs, by blocking private actors' efforts to achieve
socially desirable objectives. Beyond this, he suggests that laws compelling
trustworthy conduct may have the paradoxical effect of suppressing people's
intrinsic motives to act in a trustworthy manner. Less visibly, by putting
regulatory schemes in his supportive category, he frames consideration of their
merits in a manner that excludes other arguments on their behalf.
Trust versus other justifications for regulation. I shall address this last
concem first. It is most evident in Hall's discussion of legal protection for
health information privacy. A large body of scholarship and caselaw treats
98
privacy as a right, important for personal dignity and psychological welfare.
The law's protection for medical privacy follows from this more general
right.99 Yet Hall disregards both the existence of this right and its grounding in
the law's concern for citizens' dignity and mental well-being. Neither the
therapeutic privilege nor federal health information privacy regulation, he
contends, are premised, in the main, on a right to privacy. Rather, they are
"explicitly premised on the therapeutic need to reassure patients that they can
trust their physicians . . . ."100 Thus all that matters for Hall in evaluating the
need for these (and other) legal protections for medical privacy is whether these
safeguards do in fact promote trust. 10 1 The actual protection these safeguards
provide for citizens' privacy interests does not count within Hall's evaluative
framework, since these interests, in themselves, are not part of his framework.
Hall is on stronger ground in treating regulation of physicians' financial
incentives as law meant to support trust. Critics of monetary rewards to doctors
for withholding care have focused on the question of betrayal of trust. 10 2 But
98. Review of the voluminous literature on the right to privacy is beyond my scope
here. But this much is clear: Since the origins of the right in Warren and Brandeis's classic
article, its principal rationale has been protection against mental distress and loss of liberty
resulting from invasion of privacy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). Although the constitutional dimensions of the
right to privacy have received much discussion in recent decades, the right began as a tort
concept, and emotional distress ensuing from its violation has propelled the right's
development in tort law. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383
(1960) (discussing the development of the law of privacy through an examination of privacy
cases since Warren and Brandeis's article).
99. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 494-99

(1995).
100. Hall, supra note 60, at 499. To support this proposition, Hall cites: (1) language
in federal health information privacy regulation discussing what he calls the "perceived
need" to reassure patients in order to take advantage of the efficiencies of computerized
medical data, id. n.144, and (2) language from Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996),

justifying the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms of the need for trust to enable
treatment to succeed, Hall, supra note 60, at 499.
101. Id. at 505-06.
102. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Health Law, Policy, and Ethics Scholars at 16-20,
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (No. 98-1949) (urging that fiduciary duty
provisions in ERISA be construed to limit HMOs' financial rewards to physicians for frugal
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these incentives raise other concerns. They have the potential to reduce the
intensity and/or quality of care to socially undesired levels. They make health
care rationing less visible, and in the eyes of some, less legitimate, than it
would be were it to be done based on detailed contractually or legally mandated
allocative rules.
By making rationing less visible, they obscure the
stratification of standards of care according to economic class. This lowers the
profile of health care equity concerns on the political agenda. And by making
cost management a matter of individual physicians' discretion, they create
more room for stereotypes, biases, and differential empathy that engender racial
and ethnic disparities in care. 103 Finally, laws mandating disclosure of
physicians' incentives promote patient autonomy by giving consumers some
say concerning these incentives. None of these concerns count within Hall's
evaluative framework, except insofar as they have spillover effects on patient
trust.
The resiliency of trust. Hall's chief complaint about regulatory schemes he
says are meant to foster patients' trust is that this support is unnecessary. He
contends that empirical research, including his own, does not substantiate the
premise that trust is put at risk by the breaches of medical privacy, financial
incentives, and other health care industry practices he considers. Here, he
overreaches. He leaps too facilely from this negative claim-that the data fail
to support the hypothesis of trust-at-risk-to the judgment that trust is resilient,
1 04
indeed a "resource ...which can be expended without serious depletion,"
05
and to the surmise that much trust-promoting regulation is unneeded. 1
The surveys Hall reviews set out a weak case for the proposition that
physicians' financial incentives and other managed care cost control practices
do not put patient trust at risk. 106 Telephone surveys done by Hall's team and
practice); M. Gregg Bloche, U.S. Health Care After Pegram: Betrayal at the Bedside?,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 224, 225.
103. See COMM. ON UNDERSTANDING & ELIMINATING RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE, INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC

DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds.,
2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/030908265X/html (hereinafter INST. OF MED.,
UNEQUAL TREATMENT); M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 95, 115 (2001) (discussing ways in which cost
containment strategies contribute to racial disparities in health care provision).
104. Hall, supra note 60, at 526.
105. He hedges carefully here, by conceding multiple limitations in the studies he
reviews, id. at 506, by acknowledging that he has not proven that trust is as resilient as he
suspects; and by remarking that "those who advocate supportive legal measures should not
have to bear the burden of proving their case empirically." Id.at 509. Yet elsewhere, he
takes the resiliency of trust as a given, id.at 508, and suggests (albeit in language softened
with frequent use of "may" and "can") that trust-promoting regulation should be viewed with
"caution" and should have "weak or nondirective enforcement mechanisms." Id. at 509,
511.
106. Space constraints preclude my discussing the several surveys Hall mentions that
were conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s to examine the effects of the
psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege and the Tarasoff rule (requiring

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 55:919

others show that respondents' faith in the fidelity and ability of their personal
physicians remained high through the 1990s, 10 7 despite rising public criticism
of managed care. Phone surveys, though, have serious limitations as tools for
probing people's underlying structures of belief and their hopes and
anxieties. 108 Subjects' instant, unreflective reporting of their impressions in
response to a string of brief questions cannot capture the strength or fragility of
these impressions-or the layers of understanding that generate these
impressions. Use of focus groups and in-depth, semi-structured interviews by
political consultants and market researchers to craft campaign and product
promotion messages reflects this limitation.
Psychology and economics researchers have observed that people's surface
beliefs about many things tend to remain relatively stable for long periods,
punctuated by rapid shifts. People's adherence to social norms 10 9 and
investors' valuations of stocks and other assets 110 illustrate this tendency.
Cognitive and emotional change beneath the waterline of expressed preferences
sets the stage for such surface-level shifts but is only dimly understood. To the
extent that trust in the health sphere behaves in this fashion, telephone survey
questions are unlikely to detect its impending collapse-until it is too late.

psychotherapists to warn potential victims when patients make serious threats of violence)
on people's willingness to seek treatment. Id. at 505. But my concerns about his inferences
from these studies are similar to the concerns I will presently discuss, in the managed care
context.
107. See Mark A. Hall, Beiyao Zheng, Elizabeth Dugan, Fabian Camacho, Kristin E.
Kidd, Aneil Mishra & Rajesh Balkrishnan, MeasuringPatients' Trust in Their Primary Care
Providers, 59 MED. CARE REs. & REV. 293 (2002); Audiey C. Kao, Diane C. Green, Alan
M. Zaslavsky, Jeffrey P. Koplan & Paul D. Cleary, The Relationship Between Method of
Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708 (1998). The survey done by Hall's
team yielded highly positive (favorable) responses to questions to consumers about their
doctors' fidelity to patients in the face of financial and other pressures from health care
payers.
108. Hall's study team grasped this problem and tried to compensate for it, by using
focus groups to probe people's understanding of the trust issues raised by prospective
questionnaire items. The team selected and modified items based on this focus group
inquiry, then pilot-tested its selected items, then conducted qualitative interviews with eight
pilot test respondents to examine their understandings of the items. The items were then
modified again. Hall et al., supra note 107, at 298-99. Hall's team, in short, appears to have
done the best it could, within the limits of the telephone survey genre. Had the team
employed focus groups and qualitative interviews as research tools in themselves, rather than
as methods of crafting and selecting survey items, it might have penetrated more deeply into
subjects' understandings, hopes, and fears.
109. See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirschleifer & Ivo Welsh, A Theory of Fads,
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as InformationalCascades, 100 J. POL. ECoN. 992
(1992) (discussing sudden shifts in previously stable customs and cultural norms), cited in
Cass R. Sunstein, SocialNorms andSocial Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912 n.30 (1996).
110. Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 QJ. ECoN. 797, 800
(1992) (discussing "excess volatility" in many asset markets); In Ho Lee, Market Crashes
and Informational Avalanches, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 741, 753 (1998) (suggesting that
markets are likely to be more volatile after long periods of stability).
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Signs that trust is at high risk in the health sphere are more evident than
Hall acknowledges. The enormous anti-managed care jury verdicts that Hall
dismisses as overreactions to betrayal are sentinels of this risk. Cases in which

jurors learn of previously hidden financial incentives to withhold care are
natural experiments-tests of people's responses to infidelity in the medical
realm. The anti-managed care backlash in the press, Congress, and state
legislatures has been driven by the disconnect between promises of professional
fidelity and needed care and the realities of conflict of interest and pressure to
set limits. Indeed, one prominent health care contractarian has endorsed
limited patient protection legislation as an antidote to distrust of managed
care. 111

Physician reports of rising patient distrust are another worrisome sign that
Hall disregards. A 1997 nationwide survey of more than 1500 midcareer
physicians found that more than half believed that changes in their work
environments over the previous five years had adversely affected their patients'
1 12
Physician-respondents who reported an overall financial incentive to
113
limit services were more likely than others to report diminished patient trust.
One might discount these findings as "nonspecific indicators of physician
dissatisfaction with change, or as a reaction to diminished professional
autonomy." 1 14 On the other hand, physicians are better situated than any other
115
observers to pick up overt and subtle signs of their patients' distrust.
There is, moreover, evidence that patients who belong to racial and ethnic
minority groups experience less trust in their physicians than do white

trust.

111. Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: HardPolitics
Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 409-16 (2001). Another study by Hall's survey
research team underscores the managed care industry's risky disconnect between promise
and reality: Telling health plan subscribers about their physicians' financial incentives to
practice frugally increased these subscribers' self-reported trust in their doctors. Mark A.
Hall, Elizabeth Dugan, Rajesh Balkrishnan & Donald Bradley, How Disclosing HMO
Physician Incentives Affects Trust, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 197, 204. This result is
consistent with a causal connection between disingenuity and distrust.
112. Daniel P. Sulmasy, M. Gregg Bloche, Jean M. Mitchell & Jack Hadley,
Physicians' Ethical Beliefs About Cost-Control Arrangements, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 649, 651-52 (2000). This study employed survey methodology similar to that used by
Hall's research team: Items were developed and selected with focus group guidance, then
refined by professional survey designers using cognitive pretesting techniques. See id. at
650.
113. Id. at 653 (inferring from multivariate regression analysis). More than three
quarters of the survey's respondents indicated that they believed financial incentives
"designed to encourage physicians to be more restrained in their use of medical resources for
individual patients" are ethically unacceptable. Id. at 651.
114. Id. at 653.
115. Patients' reports concerning their trust in their physicians have been found to be
highly correlated with physicians' perceptions of that trust. Robert F. St. Peter, Access to
Specialists: Perspectives of Patients and Primary Care Physicians, CENTER FOR STUDYING
HEALTH SYS. CHANGE DATA BULL., Fall 1997, at 1-2.
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patients. 116 Hall discounts the likelihood and significance of such a trust
gap,1 17 but numerous studies suggest its existence and clinical impact. An
Institute of Medicine examination of this literature found correlations between
physician-patient racial concordance and a wide range of empirical indicators
of the quality of the doctor-patient relationship, including measures of
physician verbal dominance, patient satisfaction, and participatory
decisionmaking and patient-centered care. 118
To the extent that these
indicators correlate with patient trust (and there is reason for believing that they
do'19), there is a connection between trust and physician-patient racial
concordance. 120 Given that white patients are more likely to visit same-race
physicians than are patients in racial minority groups, 12 1 any link between trust
and doctor-patient racial concordance translates into a trust gap between white
and minority Americans.
My point is not that health law and policy should pursue the goal of
increased physician-patient racial concordance. Efforts to achieve this by
means other than increasing the representation of racial minorities in the
medical profession would be problematic for many reasons. My point, rather,
is that we have reason to believe that minority patients feel less trustful in
clinical settings than do their white counterparts. There is, moreover, good
reason to suspect that this trust gap makes a clinical difference. Beyond the
therapeutic potential of trust and the sense of security that comes from faith that
the doctor is on our side, there is the link between trust and treatment refusal.
Several studies have found that African-American patients are less likely than
whites to agree to invasive, technology-intensive treatments. 122 Whether this
disparity is due to a black-white trust gap cannot be answered with currently

116. See INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 103, at 105-11.

117. Hall, supra note 60, at 507 n.181 (concluding that findings of a statistically
significant relationship between trust and patient race have not been "consistent across
studies" and "are not of a very large magnitude").
118. See generally INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 103. In addition

to patient surveys, these studies drew upon analyses of audiotapes of doctor-patient visits.
119. Hall's empirical work supports this point: He detects close correlation between
patients' "global trust" and their impressions of physician competence, and he in turn notes
that other studies have found that patients tend to assess physician competence based upon
their impressions of doctors' interpersonal skills. See Hall et al., supra note 107, at 313.
120. Hall appears to deny such a connection, asserting that doctors' race has "little or
no impact on trust, even when ...matched with patients' demographics." Hall, supra note

60, at 508.
121. The likelihood of racial concordance between minority patients and their
physicians is diminished not only for the obvious reason that being in a minority in an
integrated society makes one less likely than majority group members to encounter same-

race professionals, but also because racial minorities tend to be underrepresented among
American physicians, in proportion to these minority groups' presence in the overall
population. INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 103, at 106-09.
122. Id. at 110-11. Racial differences in treatment refusal rates, it should be noted, do
not fully explain racial disparities in the medical care that Americans receive. Id. at 141.
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available data. 123 But to the extent that these treatments yield desirable health
outcomes, this possibility is troubling.
"Crowding out" trust. Hall bases another set of arguments against
managed care regulation on the behavioral economics literature concerning the
"crowding out" of intrinsic motivation to cooperate. Contributors to this genre
emphasize the potential of both legal mandates and market incentives to
suppress intrinsic, noncalculative motives. 124 Hall focuses almost exclusively
on the former. "Patients' Bill of Rights" provisions, he contends, risk
promoting self-interested physician and health plan behavior by signaling to
doctors and insurers "that they are not in fact trusted and are not expected to act
on the basis of intrinsically trustworthy motivations." 125 Hall's inattention here
to an equal and opposite implication of the "crowding out" literature-that
incentives to skimp on care and referrals can suppress physicians' fidelity to
patients and plan administrators' good faith concerning coverage issues-is
126
stunning.
His claim that regulation, all regulation of managed care, 127 produces only
literalistic compliance "to the extent of actual enforcement" 128 disregards
another large theme in the behavioral science literature on law: law's power to
strengthen people's internal commitment to rules of conduct. 129 Law gains
123. The possible connections between patient distrust (including perceptions of racial
discrimination, aversion, or disregard) and treatment refusal, or expressed preferences for
less intensive treatment, are enormously complex and difficult to disentangle for empirical
study. The interplay between patients' and providers' behavior and attitudes during the
clinical encounter, and the impact of these interactions on the care that members of different
racial groups receive, are similarly challenging to comprehend. Id. at 137-38.
124. See, e.g., Frey, Intrinsic Motivation, supra note 72, at 335-37; Frey, Institutions
and Morale, supra note 72, at 443-44. This literature's central premise is that calculative
motives-sensitivity to deterrence signals, opportunities for reciprocity, etc.-are not
enough to explain trustworthy conduct, team play, and other cooperative behaviors. A
shortcoming of this literature (in my view) is that it does not develop and test psychological
models-cognitive, affective, or otherwise-for how "crowding out" occurs.
125. Hall, supra note 60, at 509-10.
126. Hall, moreover, extends his "crowding out" claim beyond the reach of "crowding
out" logic, by asserting that the detailed protections in "Patients' Bill of Rights" proposals
"could easily convey to patients the impression that HMOs and their doctors cannot be
trusted." Id. at 509. This is a claim-utterly speculative-about the expressive function of
law, but it does not involve law's "crowding out" of target actors' intrinsic desires to act in a
trustworthy fashion. The target actors for these legal protections are clinicians and managed
care administrators, and it is their motives to be trustworthy that may or may not be crowded
out. The separate effects of these legal protections on patient trust (and patients' perceptions
of trustworthiness) are relevant to assessment of such laws but are not a matter of "crowding
out."
127. He refers here to all regulation contained in "Patients' Bill of Rights" proposals, it
would appear, since he doesn't single out any particular regulatory approach for discussion.
128. Id. at 510.
129. See Blair & Stout, supra note 38, at 1785-89 (concluding that fiduciary
relationships created by the law build a foundation for psychological commitment to
trustworthy conduct within these relationships); Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2024-25 (1996)
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enormous leverage, far beyond the state's commitment to enforcement, when
target actors embrace the norms law expresses. Hall references this literature
and acknowledges this point; indeed, he notes the success of banking and
insurance regulation in reconstructing business trustworthiness and consumers'
trust. 130 This vision of law's relationship to people's intrinsic motivation is the
converse of the "crowding out" thesis. For anyone seeking insight into how a
regulatory scheme might function in practice, these two, opposed behavioralist
propositions pose a dilemma: How are we to predict whether a law will fortify
or undermine people's internal motives?
Hall concedes the need to address this question, but he then miscasts it, in a
way that ordains answers hostile to robust legal protection for health care
consumers. He does so by framing the task as one of "distinguish[ing] between
law's regulatory and expressive functions," 13 1 rather than determining whether
a law will reinforce or undermine target actors' internal motives to comply.
This leads him, unsurprisingly, to urge "broad standards rather than detailed
rules" and "weak or nondirective enforcement mechanisms." 132 He thus
criticizes judicial review of medical coverage decisions, 133 laws barring health
plans from limiting what doctors can tell patients, 134 and laws requiring
disclosure of financial incentives to reduce costs 135 as regulatory approaches
that express skepticism of trust and thereby undermine it.
More provocatively, Hall suggests a strategy he calls "lip-service respect
for the law," under which "trust-related laws are commonly violated at the
same time that their underlying principles continue to be used for rhetorical
advantage."'1 36 Disjunctions between loftily stated principle and the operation
of law in practice are a common means of philosophical and political
compromise. 137 But such compromise is unstable. There is a thriving market
(exploring "the expressive function of law-the function of law in 'making statements' as
opposed to controlling behavior directly" and discussing "how legal 'statements' might be
designed to change social norms").
130. Hall, supranote 60, at 516-18.
131. Id. at 511.
132. Id.He cites Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. HardShoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607 (2000), for this proposition, but Kahan, more than
Hall, grounds his case for "gentle nudges" on discussion of the connections between the
law's "nudges" and "shoves" and the psychology of target actors' internal motives. See id.
at 641-43.
133. Hall, supra note 60, at 515.
134. Id. at517,519.
135. Id. at 514-15.
136. Id. at 511.

137. Such compromise can arise both from society's commitment to absolute
principles that are contradicted by other needs (e.g., commitment to the pricelessness of life
and to economic development that entails risk, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978)), and from political dealmaking (e.g., regulatory statutes
with sweeping, idealistic preambles, written to satisfy social activists, and multiple, arcane
loopholes, designed to allay industry objections).
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for exposure of political and legal contradiction. Scholars, journalists, political
advocates, and litigators take delight in revealing it, and their respective
audiences pay handsome rewards, in prestige, recognition, and money.
Revelation disrupts covert philosophical and legislative deals, and conflicts that
were put to rest through disjunction between the law's rhetoric and the law in
action reemerge.
For society's most painful philosophical and political choices, unstable
compromises of this sort may be the best that we can do. But the instability of
these deals makes their constituent statements of principle into poor vehicles
for law's expressive function. And exposure of repeated failure to honor the
law's promises corrodes the sense of reciprocity that is needed for trust and
38
trustworthiness to emerge in voluntaristic fashion in ongoing relationships.
Cynicism is the more likely message, and distrust of the law the more likely
result.
3.

Regulation as distrust.

Hall constructs a separate category of laws skeptical toward trust by
treating robust regulation of managed care as premised on the industry's
untrustworthiness. Most regulation of the industry, he holds, constitutes
"institutionalize[d] distrust," rather than an effort to shore up its
trustworthiness. 139 Regulation built on the premise that health care institutions
cannot be trusted signals patients to withhold their trust, he contends. Hall then
reminds readers of the therapeutic importance of patient trust: Ergo, he says,
institutionalizing distrust through law is a bad idea. Therefore, taking managed
care as a given, 140 we should eschew aggressive regulation of the industry in
favor of less intrusive strategies that will, by avoiding the "crowding out"
problem, foster trustworthiness and trust.
To characterize regulation of managed care as premised on the industry's
untrustworthiness and as expressive of distrust, Hall casts regulation as a bid to
create "a confidence-building substitute for trust. ' 14 1 Requiring HMOs to tell
patients about rewards to doctors for limiting care, he claims, presumes that
138. See Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract
Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997) (arguing

that "reciprocal behavior may cause an increase in the set of enforceable contracts and may
thus allow the achievement of nonnegligible efficiency gains"); Matthew Rabin,
IncorporatingFairnessinto Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993)

(presenting data and models bearing on roles of reciprocity and fairness in development of
cooperative relationships).
139. Hall, supra note 60, at 512.

140. That he takes the managed care industry as a given is clear from his response to
frank distrust of the industry by proponents of government-sponsored, single-payer medical
coverage as an alternative. Their opposition to the industry on trustworthiness grounds, he
says, "is equivalent to curing an infectious disease by killing its host." Id.
141. Id. at515.
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physicians with such incentives are untrustworthy. 142 In addition, he says,
independent review and judicial scrutiny of medical coverage decisions
substitute trust in review panels or courts for trust (or lack thereof) in
insurers. 143 But Hall's characterizations of these and other regulatory measures
are hardly self-evident. Mandatory disclosure of incentives to doctors to limit
treatment could just as easily be characterized as both autonomy-regarding and
trust-promoting.
Indeed, Hall's own research supports this alternative
characterization.
His telephone survey team found that informing HMO
subscribers about their physicians' financial incentives to limit care increased
144
these subscribers' self-reported trust in their doctors.
Likewise, outside review of coverage decisions could just as easily be
characterized as supportive of trust in insurers. Recent evidence is consistent
with this: In states that mandate independent administrative review of medical
coverage denials, the right to review is rarely invoked. 14 5 The managed care
industry's endorsement of mandatory independent review 146 is likewise
consistent with the thesis that such review fosters trust in health plans. Hall
might reply by asserting (as he does elsewhere) 147 a distinction between trust
and confidence, then claiming that review of coverage denials fosters the latter,
not the former. Some commentary supports the drawing of such a line, based
on the role of emotive versus calculative thinking about fidelity and
reliability. 148 But current psychological thinking favors a blurring of this line.
Deepening understanding of emotional influences on our values, preferences,
and calculative reasoning 149 is consistent with a holistic account of trust and
confidence as a set of interconnected feelings and beliefs. 150 Such an account
142.
143.
144.
145.
2001, at
requests

Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
See Hall et al., supra note 111, at 203.
See Raja Mishra, Shortage of Cases for HMO Agency, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27,
Al. An additional explanation for the low frequency of independent review
might be greater insurer willingness to authorize coverage at earlier stages, in

anticipation of the possibility of independent review.
146. See Stephanie Kanwit, General Counsel of the American Association of Health
Plans, Remarks at the Acadamey of Health Services Research and Health Policy Annual
Meeting, Roundtable Session: "Beyond the Patients' Bill of Rights: The Law & Politics of
Managed Care" (June 25, 2002) (explaining that AAHP endorses federally mandated
independent review) (audiotapes on file with Academy of Health Services Research and
Health Policy).
147. Hall, supra note 60, at 513-14.
148. See generally Williamson, supra note 4.
149. See generally DAMASIO, supra note 34; Jorge L. Armony, David ServanSchreiber, Jonathan D. Cohen & Joseph E. LeDoux, Computational Modeling of Emotion:
Explorations Through the Anatomy and Physiology of Fear Conditioning, 1 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 28 (1997); Loewenstein et al., supra note 34.
150. Hall's own, empirically based account of trust is holistic in this sense: It draws
upon survey respondents' self-reporting concerning their doctors' fidelity, competence,
honesty, and keeping of confidences. Hall's survey research team found that respondents'
answers to questions designed to measure their beliefs within each of these categories
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makes it implausible to contend that a law can promote confidence in an
institution (or individual) while undermining trust.
In short, Hall's
characterization of managed care regulations (or at least those he targets:
external review of coverage decisions and mandatory disclosure of financial
incentives) as "institutionalize[d] distrust" is speculative and against the grain
of the available evidence.
CONCLUSION: MARKETS FOR TRUST AND BETRAYAL

Mark Hall's central claim about the law governing the medical marketplace
is that it risks being too solicitous of patients' trust. "Ethics and public policy
tend to treat patient trust as a precious species," he protests. 15 1 "[A]nother
view of trust produces a radically different conclusion"-that "trust in
physicians should be viewed as a resource," to be "expended without serious
' 152
depletion to do much of the heavy lifting required by health care policy.
Cost containment is the heavy lifting that most needs to be done, he holds, and
doctors should not shy away from doing it. Physicians, not insurers or
government, should ration care at the bedside because the medical profession is
153
a "more resilient repository of trust."
Citing Robert Putnam, Hall draws a parallel between trust and social
capital: Both do a great deal of heavy lifting in a healthy society. 154 This is
more than an apt analogy. Trust is a crucial constituent of social capital. 155
The generalized reciprocity that mutual trust makes possible reduces stress and
transaction costs, fostering physical and social well-being. 156 But this
reciprocity, or social trust, rests on mutual trustworthiness. 157 It is jeopardized
by betrayal-by one-sided failure to meet mutual expectations. 158 This is the
central flaw in Hall's argument, and it is the danger his prescription presents.
Hall wants physicians to do the heavy lifting of cost control by drawing
upon the trust they have accrued through the profession's commitment to
fidelity to patients. But bedside rationing, done covertly via professional
correlated closely with each other, to the extent that the team formulated a fifth variable,
"global trust," closely correlated to the other four and expressive of the one-dimensionality
of medical trust. Hall et al., supra note 107, at 312-13.
151. Hall, supra note 60, at 526.
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. Id. & n.248.
155. See PUTNAM, supra note 12, at 19-26, 134-47.
156. See id at 135.
157. See id. at 136.

158. Curiously, Hall seems to realize that people take much umbrage over betrayal,
since he interprets a good deal of medical tort law as a means for managing people's
overreactions to betrayal. See supra text accompanying notes 79-92. This makes it puzzling
that he fails to acknowledge the threat to medical trust posed by betrayal of expectations at
the bedside.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:919

discretion, does not square with this commitment to fidelity. It breaks faith
with patients, and the thriving market for exposure of contradiction between
159
avowed commitment and covert realities ensures that this will be found out.
Hall is wrong about trust's resilience in the face of such discovery-wrong in
denying that the calculated breaches of faith he urges will result in trust's
depletion.
But does this mean aggressive regulation is the only preventive against
potential breaches of faith and other disappointed consumer expectations? I
think not; indeed, I argue elsewhere that regulation plays only a subsidiary
protective role. 160 Markets, in this regard, work better than many market
proponents recognize. As Kenneth Arrow observed forty years ago, there is a
market for professional trustworthiness: Ethical commitment to fidelity to
patients and self-control over financial self-interest are "part of the commodity
the physician sells. ' 16 1 There is also a market for institutional trustworthiness
and reliability. Institutions, especially health care payers, have become much
more powerful in the medical sphere since Arrow made his observations, and
consumer awareness of this power translates into consumer demand for
trustworthiness and reliability.
There are, moreover, markets for betrayal, or, more precisely, markets that
detect, expose, and punish it. There is monetary and psychic reward for
revelation of political and legal contradiction, 162 and there are payoffs for those
who spotlight inconsistencies between what private actors promise and do. 163
To the extent that dismay over these inconsistencies influences consumers'
health care and coverage choices, markets penalize betrayals of trust and
confidence. Investors' ongoing efforts to anticipate and respond to consumers'
medical care and coverage preferences magnify the economic cost of consumer
164
dismay for firms that rely upon capital markets.
Health care payers', providers', and investors' efforts to anticipate
regulatory and legal change are another large influence upon these actors'
market choices. Through the 1990s, anticipation of political and legal
developments (e.g., enactment of a federal "Patients' Bill of Rights") that did
159. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
160. M. Gregg Bloche, One Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressures and the
Evolution of Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES, supranote 21.

161. Arrow, supranote 26, at 965.
162. See supratext accompanying notes 137-38.
163. Public officials (and candidates for political office), litigators, investigative
journalists, political activists, and even investment advisors are on the lookout for such
inconsistency in the private sphere, and their varied audiences reward them with reputational
and financial benefits.
164. The investment community has taken a keen interest in consumer responses to
health plans' administrative practices, coverage options, and other cost-control strategies.
Investors' assessments of consumer reaction, both observed and expected, are a powerful
influence upon firms that depend on debt and equity markets. See Bloche, supra note 160.
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not in fact occur played a bigger role in bringing about health systems change
165
than did actual legislative or judicial intervention.
These interconnected markets play out in raucous fashion, chaotic beyond
the capacity of game theorists to model and predict. But in general, they push
health care payers and providers away from arrangements that betray or
otherwise break with consumer expectations. During the mid and late 1990s,
they pushed health plans away from frequent denial of services on medical
necessity grounds, 166 and they may now be nudging plans away from financial
incentives to physicians to limit care. 167
Markets for medical trustworthiness are notably unstable, judging by the
experience of the past 100 years. Professional commitment to the ethic of
undivided loyalty to patients and suppression of self-interest has fluctuated
widely since the late nineteenth century, as has consumer demand for signs of
this commitment. 168 The turn-of-the-twentieth-century medical marketplace
was a cacophony of unabashed commercial claims for unproven nostrums.
Consumer skepticism about physicians' therapeutic claims and financial
motives was a staple of popular culture. 169 But by the 1920s, the medical
profession, concerned about its credibility, was well on its way toward
suppressing commercialism and asserting its ethical commitments to fidelity
and quality. By the 1950s, public trust and confidence in the medical
profession was at a historic high.170 A new equilibrium of consumer belief and
expectation had become established, more favorable to the profession than
were the expectations of commercialism early in the century. But having won
Americans' trust, the profession was under less pressure to prove its
trustworthiness. During the 1960s and 1970s, physicians took opportunistic
advantage, investing in hospitals, laboratories, and other businesses.
Commitment to the ethic of suppression of self-interest flagged. The 1980s and
1990s saw a return to frank commercialism with parallels to the medical
entrepreneurship of 100 years ago.171
165. Id.
166. Id.

167. Cara S. Lesser & Paul B. Ginsburg, Back to the Future? New Cost and Access
Challenges Emerge, ISSUE BRIEF (Center for Studying Health Systems Change), Feb. 2001,
at 4, available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/295/.
168. Bloche, supra note 29, at 1108.
169. George Bernard Shaw's scathing account of physicians' materialistic motives in
his 1906-produced comedy, The Doctor's Dilemma, is illustrative of this skeptical ethos.
BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA, GETTING MARRIED, AND THE SHEWING-UP OF

BLANCO POSNET (1911).
170. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 335-37

(1982).
171. Similarities include aggressive advertising, price competition, quality claims, and
seeming unself-consciousness about commercial methods and motives.
The chief
differences lie in the units of competition (between individual clinicians and other sellers of
nostrums 100 years ago; between managed health plans, hospitals, and other large firms, for
the most part, today) and in the regulatory environment (quality claims and market entry are
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These shifting patterns of professional self-restraint and patient trust and
confidence are an object lesson for anyone inclined to presume trust's
resiliency. They caution that downward cascades of trust and trustworthiness
are a possibility. But they also hold out hope that consumer (and investor)
demand for trustworthiness can prevent such cascades. Indeed, this demand
can help to reconstitute lost trustworthiness, trust, and confidence-if those
whom consumers want to trust seize the entrepreneurial opportunity.
Does regulation have a role to play in promoting trustworthiness in the
health sphere? To answer this question is to confront an irony: Citizen demand
for laws to promote trustworthiness parallels consumer demand in the medical
marketplace. Popular concern about whether doctors and health plans can be
trusted translates into both political pressure for regulation and market pressure
on medical care providers and insurers to eschew trust-eroding practices. Thus,
as a practical matter, we may see either overlapping, perhaps duplicative
political and market responses to trust-endangering practices or (if the public is
little-concerned about trust) neither a political nor a market reaction. Scholars'
"either-or" discussions of regulatory versus market solutions to problems tend
to disregard the real-world truth that we often end up with either both or
neither, depending on the intensity of popular concern.172
This is not to say that regulation has no role. Trustworthiness-enhancing
mandates can surmount market failures, and they can extend the benefits of
trustworthiness to consumers who lack the buying power to insist on
trustworthy clinical and administrative practice. Beyond this, such mandates
may have a powerful expressive function173-they may help to inculcate and
reinforce trustworthy norms of clinical and administrative conduct. Public
debate over proposed regulation, moreover, can both inform consumers about
untrustworthy market practices and mobilize them to avoid health plans and
providers that engage in them.
Debate over regulatory proposals thus
ameliorates information and collective action problems, enabling markets to
work better, 174 even when regulation is not enacted.
Assessment of regulatory proposals should pay heed to their benefits for
narrow interest groups at the public's expense. Doctors' and hospitals'
ongoing efforts to win antitrust law exemption for price-setting practices are

more tightly restricted today, by tort and contract law, licensing, and myriad consumer

protection statutes).
172. An illustration of the both-or-neither phenomenon is the enactment, in most states,

of statutes granting patients a right to independent review of managed care coverage denials,
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2178 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
while managed health plans were cutting back sharply, during the late 1990s, on the

incidence of such denials, in response to subscriber dissatisfaction, Bloche, supra note 160.
173. See text accompanying notes 40-42.
174. There is a downside risk here as well: Public debate can mislead consumers about
the incidence and effects of controversial industry practices, resulting in welfare-reducing
consumer choices.
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illustrative. 175 Sorting out such special interest advocacy from proposals that
promise wider benefit is exceedingly difficult, as public choice theorists are
wont to point out, especially since public officials with ties to affected interests
are often the ones doing.the sorting out. More visible advocacy by scholars and
researchers who are free of such ties can make a valuable contribution in this
regard, by informing decisionmakers (and voters) and by raising the political
cost attached to interest group giveaways.
There remains the challenge that Hall and other health care contractarians
have set as their main focus-containment of medical spending. As taxpayers,
health insurance purchasers, and price-conscious shoppers for goods and
services, we demand medical cost control-from government, our own health
plans, and the businesses we patronize. That we resist these controls when we
and our loved ones face life-threatening or life-changing illness is, for
contractarians, the central dilemma of health care policy. Hall's call for covert
bedside rationing challenges his critics to come up with an alternative approach
to this dilemma.
Elsewhere, I contend that the contractarians' insistence on according trump
value to people's ex ante health care choices-the decisions they make, often
by default, when they buy health insurance-is at odds with core human needs
that we look to medical care to meet.1 7 6 Needs for care and respect, protection
against abandonment, and preservation of hope for rescue in dire circumstances
engender health care spending well in excess of levels we would choose ex
ante. 177 The challenge for health law and policy is to mediate between the
dispassionate, efficiency-oriented reasoning associated with the ex ante
perspective and our emotive, fearful, and hopeful thinking at moments of
medical crisis. A caring society, responsive to people's hopes and fears as
expressed through both democratic and market means, will spend more on
medicine than might seem wise, ex ante. A robust society, able to take the long
view of its members' interests and needs, will find ways to avoid the resource
depletion that ensues from giving carte blanche to people in dire circumstances.
I have argued in this Comment that disingenuity as first resort is an unwise
approach to the conflict between our ex ante and our later, illness-endangered
selves. Not only does rationing by tacit deceit raise a host of moral problems, it
will not work, over the long haul, because markets reward deceit's unmasking.
The honesty about clinical limit-setting that some bioethicists urge 178 may not

175. See Hammer, supra note 21.

176. Bloche, supra note 43.
177. Id.
178. See e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL

PROGRESS 261-62 (1990) (arguing that lack of open discussion about health care priorities
has led us to "spend too much on health in comparison with other social needs, too much on
the old in comparison with the young, too much on the acutely ill in comparison with the
chronically ill, too much on curing in comparison with caring, too much on expensive
individual health needs in comparison with less expensive societal health needs, and too
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be fully within our reach. But more candor is possible than we now achieve,
and the more conscious we are about decisions to impose limits, the more
inclined we will be to accept them without experiencing betrayal.
Law can help in this regard, by nudging us toward more conscious medical
spending choices. The Supreme Court's pointed observation two years ago, in
Pegram v. Herdrich, that HMOs control spending by rationing care 179 was a
step in this direction. The Court's immunization of health plans from
malpractice suits when restrictions on medical coverage and care are made
explicit to health plan subscribers through ERISA benefit descriptions 180 is
another nudge toward conscious choice. This selective liability shield invites
health plans to break out of their business-as-usual practice of setting limits
covertly, via opaque, "medical necessity" language in insurance contracts and
financial incentives to providers to withhold care. Additional legal rewards for
directness and penalties for opacity should be a major focus of managed care
reform.
Law can encourage more candid limit-setting, but it cannot force-feed
conscious choice to consumers who don't want to face it. The psychology of
denial ensures an unavoidable minimum of anger and bitterness when health
care payers and providers fall short of unfounded expectations. By nudging our
culture toward more conscious acceptance of limits, health law can ease, but
not eliminate, this anger and bitterness. Remaking health law as a tool for
limit-setting by deceit, on the other hand, would lead to downward cycles of
anger and distrust, with tragic consequences for medicine's healing potential.

much on extending the length of life rather than enhancing the quality of life").
179. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221 (2000) (declaring that "inducement to
ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme").
180. See supra note 24.

